Home USAAssessing the Brown-George Trade: Who Wins a Blockbuster: 76ers or Celtics?

Assessing the Brown-George Trade: Who Wins a Blockbuster: 76ers or Celtics?

by OmarAli
Assessing the Brown-George Trade: Who Wins a Blockbuster: 76ers or Celtics?

Several authors

Giannis Antetokounmpo is finally a member of the Miami Heat. Kawhi Leonard has returned to the Toronto Raptors. LaMelo Ball and Anthony Edwards are teammates.

This NBA offseason has been full of exciting and jaw-dropping trades, but the most surprising of them all happened on Wednesday night when the Boston Celtics traded Jaylen Brown to the Philadelphia 76ers for Paul George, two first-round picks and two second-round picks.

According to ESPN insider Shams Charania, Philadelphia sent Boston a 2028 first-round draft pick that could go from a first to a better trade for Boston, an unprotected 2031 first-round pick, a 2028 second-round pick (most favorable of GSW/OKC/MIL) and a 2030 second-round pick (most favorable of WAS/POR/PHX).

Just two years ago, Brown was the Finals MVP; Just two months ago, he finished sixth in regular-season MVP voting after the best individual season of his career. And now he’ll be playing for one of Boston’s biggest rivals after 10 years with the Celtics.

Let’s appreciate this stunning spectacle, starting with an attempt – perhaps futile – to justify Boston’s logic.

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Boston Celtics: D+

Here’s a quick takeaway: The Celtics could very well win more than 50 games again next season. After all, they went 56-26 last season despite playing just 16 games with Jayson Tatum recovering from a torn Achilles.

If Tatum is fully healthy next season, he could match Brown’s production in 2025-26. Otherwise, the Celtics improved this summer, adding Mitchell Robinson and still retaining the rest of the core that fueled their surprisingly strong season.

However, this is a glib way to start the analysis because replacing Brown with George makes the Celtics worse. This clearly makes them worse. Most importantly, it lowers their ceiling in the playoffs, even if players like Hugo Gonzalez, Baylor Scheuerman and Jordan Walsh can put together enough solid minutes to try to replace the departed All-Star throughout the regular season.

It’s completely strange that the Celtics would willingly take such a giant step back. They are the most successful team of the decade: Boston ranks first in regular season and playoff wins in the 2020s, and is the only team to simultaneously win a championship and reach another finals.

Just 10 days ago, the Celtics tried to trade Giannis Antetokounmpo, a superstar who is currently winning. raised their playoff ceiling. Earlier Wednesday, they signed the injury-prone Robinson to a free agent contract, presumably because he would improve their postseason performance more than it did through the first 82 games.

But now they are turning in a different direction. Either the Celtics will quickly trade the two first-round picks they received in this deal to another star, or they seem content with another year of not going all in on a title.

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This path was clear last season as they zeroed out their finances in anticipation of decline in Tatum’s absence. But that’s much less clear in 2026-27, when Tatum is now 28 years old and facing a potential decline in his prime due to injury, and 32-year-old Derrick White is on the verge of decline.

Apparently, the Celtics decided that their relationship with Brown had deteriorated to the point of no return due to various minor setbacks and rumors that he would be included in a trade for Antetokounmpo. But even in a “deal with him at any cost” scenario, this profit is quite disappointing.

A half-century ago, George would have been a solid cornerstone in a Brown trade, but at 36 years old, he has fallen significantly from his prime. George was actually a reliable player throughout last season – but only after he served a two-month, 25-game suspension for violating the league’s drug policy.

In two seasons in Philadelphia, George played a total of 78 games. He’s played more than 56 games in a season only once, dating back to the 2018-19 season, which was so long ago that he hadn’t even joined the Clippers yet.

Because George is owed $54.1 million next season and $56.6 million (player option) in 2027-28, he has one of the least team-friendly contracts in the league. If the 76ers were to try to back out of this deal with a team that has cap space, they would have to include at least one first-round pick as an enticement, making the value of Brown alone look even lower.

It’s fair to wonder how much Brown is worth, given his own increased contract — $57.1 million in 2026-27, $61.0 million in 2027-28 and $65 million in 2028-29 — and the gap between his traditional and advanced stats.

This topic has sparked controversy on social media over the past week and is worth exploring in more detail when reflecting on his staggering trading income. Compared to the raw stats, the more advanced stats are truly skeptical of Brown. Part of that has to do with his lackluster on/off numbers: Boston has been better with Brown off the court for most of his career, including the last four, according to Cleaning the Glass.

As the No. 1 scorer, Brown put up strong numbers last season, averaging 28.7 points, 6.9 rebounds and 5.1 assists per game. But he doesn’t combine elite production with elite efficiency.

Brown’s 57% career shooting percentage is league average for his career, according to Basketball Reference. Even if you look only at the last four seasons, which include both of his NBA championship campaigns, his shooting accuracy ranks 24th among the league’s 30 players with the highest usage rate. The players closest to him are De’Aaron Fox, Trae Young and Brandon Ingram, none of whom are considered franchise-changing superstars and all of whom have produced somewhat disappointing returns over the past 18 months.

Brown isn’t the most fluid passer either, with just 2.9 assists per game compared to 2.3 turnovers in his career. As his playing responsibilities have increased in recent seasons, so have his rewards: Over the past four seasons, 85 players have averaged at least four assists per game, and Brown ranks 84th among that group in assist-to-turnover ratio. (By the way, the only player below him is his new teammate Joel Embiid.)

In that context, it makes sense that other teams wouldn’t be as willing to part with a package of drafted players as Brown’s superficial stats and accolades might suggest. But there is a yawning gap between the four first-round picks, two good young players and one trade that Kevin Durant received in the 2023 trade from the Nets to the Suns, and the mere two first-round picks and one cap hit the Celtics received in that deal.

Brad Stevens has accomplished nearly every step—big and small—since becoming the Celtics’ president of basketball operations. It seems wrong to question his experience. But if this was the best return the Celtics could find for Brown, it’s hard not to think they should have tried to mend that relationship rather than dramatically reduce their title chances in 2026-27 or even save a lot of money on the deal.

The entire process of this deal, from its incentive to its final execution, is confusing.

Photo by David Dow/NBAE via Getty Images


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Philadelphia 76ers: A-

Brown could fit in very well in Philadelphia. The 76ers have two excellent guards in Tyrese Maxey and Vijay Edgecomb, as well as one excellent center in Joel Embiid. But they never had adequate strikers to combine those positional advantages, and George on a max contract was obviously not the answer.

Dean Wade seemed like a worthwhile decision when the 76ers signed him to a four-year deal on Tuesday. But Brown is on a completely different level than anyone the 76ers have tried there before. He can step up and take on more of the scoring load when the oft-injured Embiid misses time, he can act as a secondary playmaker next to Maxey, and he can provide strong perimeter defense, especially if he doesn’t expend as much of his energy on offense.

Brown could also be a huge pain in the ass in Philadelphia. He hasn’t played with an elite ball-handling point guard in years, not since Kyrie Irving’s rather disastrous tenure in Boston, and he’s never played with a position player like Embiid.

If Brown’s relationship with the Celtics deteriorated in part because of his desire to be the No. 1 player after getting a taste of that life during Tatum’s absence, he won’t get enough of it in Philadelphia. On nights when Embiid plays, Brown might be third option on his team, which is even lower in the pecking order than he was in Boston.

Last season, Brown ranked second among qualified players with a 36.2% usage rate. But Maxey has had a usage rate of 29-30% over the past two seasons, and Embiid has never had a usage rate below 33%. There are only so many shots you can take. (In this light, signing Wade, who has one of the lowest usage rates in the NBA, seems even smarter.)

But as a pure talent play, trading this package for Brown should have been an incredibly easy decision for the new 76ers front office. They’re trading a short-changer for an NBA star who’s six years younger and still in his prime, without giving up nearly all the draft capital they could have gotten in the process.

Brown is under contract for one more season than George and is eligible for a costly extension after that, so the finances aren’t ideal. However, Philadelphia’s financial flexibility was already limited by the contracts of George and Embiid, and the team still had no real chance of winning a title.

Famously, the 76ers haven’t made the conference finals since 2001, while Brown himself has been a member of six conference finals teams. He raises the 76ers’ ceiling significantly without making their uniform much more complex than it already was.

Whether stars as diverse as Maxey, Brown and Embiid can coexist, whether Embiid will ever be healthy enough in the playoffs for it to matter, or whether Brown’s dominance with the ball will hinder Edgecomb’s development remains to be seen.

But the 76ers entered this offseason with the profile of a fringe playoff team at best after three straight years in which they were a playoff team twice and a bottom-tier 24-58 team once. They now look like legitimate contenders for the final, thanks to their greatest historical rival.

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